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SUBJECT: SPAIN - A FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW

1. SUMMARY: POST-FRANCO SPAIN HAS SOUGHT TO EMPHASIZE
ITS NEW DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS, TO STRESS ITS TIES WITH
WESTERN EUROPE, AND TO SEEK TO EXPAND AND INTENSIFY ITS
RELATIONSHIPS AROUND THE WORLD. IN THE MEANTIME, OLD
PROBLEMS (GIBRALTAR, THE WESTERN SAHARA) AND NEW
(ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ATTENTION TO THE CANARY
ISLANDS) ARE REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE GOS ACTION. SPAIN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 123370

HAS NOT YET JOINED ITS FORMAL DEBATE ON POSSIBLE NATO
MEMBERSHIP, AND THAT ISSUE REMAINS IN DOUBT. OVERALL
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE US ARE GOOD, ALTHOUGH GOS
CONCERNS HAVE SURFACED REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE 1976 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. THE
EXPIRATION OF THAT TREATY IN 1981 WILL MEAN THAT SOME
TIME BEFOREHAND, THE RELATIONSHIP WILL MOVE TO THE
FOREFRONT OF THE SPANISH POLITICAL SCENE. END SUMMARY.

2. WESTERN EUROPE. POST-FRANCO SPAIN'S TOP OPERATIONAL

PRIORITY HAS BEEN GIVEN TO JOINING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (MADRID A-36). ALL THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES SUPPORTED THE MOVE, AND FORMAL APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED IN JULY 1977, SHORTLY AFTER FREE GENERAL ELECTIONS HAD RATIFIED SPAIN'S POLITICAL ELIGIBILITY. A NEAR-INCREASING ROUND OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE EC MEMBER COUNTRIES HAS UNDERSCORED THE EC ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF THE SPANISH APPLICATION, AND SPANIARDS ARE CONFIDENT THAT FULL MEMBERSHIP WILL EVENTUALLY BE THEIRS. THEY NEVERTHELESS RECOGNIZE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ACCESSION PROCESS WILL BE EXTREMELY TOUGH, AND HAVE CREATED THE NEW POSITION OF MINISTER FOR RELATIONS WITH THE EC. THEY ALSO REMAIN HIGHLY SENSITIVE TO ANY SIGN THAT, EITHER FOR POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC REASONS, THEY ARE BEING DELAYED IN ACHIEVING WHAT THEY CONSIDER IS NOW THEIR DUE. FRANCE, BECAUSE OF FISHERIES DISPUTES AND FEARS OF SPANISH AGRICULTURAL COMPETITION, IS HELD TO BE THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCK IN THIS REGARD, WHILE GERMANY, THE US, AND ITALY (DESPITE THE SIMILARITY OF THE SPANISH AND ITALIAN ECONOMIES) ARE SEEN IN MADRID AS THE MAJOR BACKERS. WHILE SPAIN SEEMS GENERALLY AWARE OF, AND RESIGNED TO, THE WRENCHING EFFECT THAT FULL MEMBERSHIP WILL COME TO HAVE ON THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 123370

PROTECTED AND NOT ALWAYS EFFICIENT INDUSTRIES, IT MAY NOT HAVE FOCUSED CLEARLY ON WHAT THE COMMUNITY IMPERATIVE OF POLITICAL COOPERATION MAY DO TO SEVERAL OF ITS TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY POSTURES.

3. AFRICA. AFRICA WAS NOT A PRIORITY AREA IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-FRANCO POLICY FORMULATION BUT HAS BECOME SO NOW BECAUSE OF THE CANARIES. SPAIN'S SUBSAHARA EXPERIENCE WAS LIMITED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO ITS EQUATORIAL GUINEA COLONY, FOLLOWING THE INDEPENDENCE OF WHICH BILATERAL RELATIONS HAVE DETERIORATED STEADILY AND ARE NOW FORMALLY SUSPENDED. THE GOS HAD NEVERTHELESS EMBARKED ON A PROCESS OF EXPANDING ITS CONTACTS IN THE AREA, ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH A WHOLE SERIES OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES. THE GOS HAD BEEN FOLLOWING THE ISSUE OF OAU ATTENTION TO THE CANARIES INDEPENDENCE GROUP MPAIAC (MOVEMENT FOR THE SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE CANARY ARCHIPELAGO), BUT HAD HOPED THAT THE SIMPLE FACT THAT THE ISLANDS HAVE NO NATIVE POPULATION OTHER THAN ETHNIC SPANIARDS THAT HAVE MOVED THERE OVER THE CENTURIES, COUPLED WITH A CONTINUING LOW-KEY EFFORT BY THE GOS TO ENCOURAGE AFRICAN AMBASSADORS IN MADRID TO VISIT THE CANARIES AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES, WOULD KEEP THE PROBLEM WITHIN MANAGEABLE BOUNDS. SINCE THE OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MID-MARCH MEETING IN TRIPOLI APPROVED A REPORT RECOMMENDING SUPPORT FOR MPAIAC (WHOSE LEADER, ANTONIO CUBILLO,

HAS LONG ENJOYED HAVEN AND RADIO FACILITIES IN ALGIERS AND WAS RECENTLY STABBED BUT NOT KILLED THERE BY TWO SPANIARDS WHOSE MOTIVES AND AFFILIATIONS REMAIN UNEXPLAINED), THE GOS HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN A DETERMINED EFFORT TO HEAD OFF SIMILAR ACTION AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM IN JULY. OREJA HAS ALREADY MADE TWO OF THE THREE TRIPS HE HAS SCHEDULED TO A VARIETY OF AFRICAN COUNTRIES, AND BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT HAVE BACKED THE EFFORT WITH SIMILAR MISSIONS OF THEIR OWN (MADRID CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 123370

4182). THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ITS CHIEF CAME IN FOR SOME SHARP CRITICISM FOLLOWING THE TRIPOLI VOTE, AND THEY TAKE THE PRE-KHARTOUM EFFORT VERY SERIOUSLY. ALTHOUGH IT MAINTAINS RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN HAS GENERALLY VOTED WITH THE AFRICAN MAJORITY ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, AND BACKS PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE AND MAJORITY RULE FOR NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA.

4. THE WESTERN SAHARA. THE SAHARA DISPUTE CONTINUES TO INVOLVE SPAIN, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GOS FORMALLY ENDED ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY OF THE TERRITORY WHEN IT WITHDREW IN FEBRUARY 1976, FOLLOWING MOROCCO'S "GREEN MARCH" AND SUBSEQUENT TRIPARTITE AGREEMENTS WITH MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA. THESE AGREEMENTS INTER ALIA TRANSFERRED ADMINISTRATION OF THE WESTERN (SPANISH) SAHARA -- BUT NOT SOVEREIGNTY, ACCORDING TO THE SPANISH POSITION, SINCE IT WAS NEVER THEIRS TO TRANSFER -- TO THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. IN PURSUIT OF ITS DECLARED POLICY OF COOPERATION AND EQUILIBRIUM IN THE MAGHREB, THE GOS HAS TRIED TO STEER A MIDDLE COURSE, APPEASING ALGERIA (WHICH BACKS THE SAHARAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT POLISARIO) BY STICKING TO ITS INSISTENCE ON SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE SAHRAWI POPULATION, AND REASSURING MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA BY VOWING STEADFAST ADHERENCE TO THE MADRID AGREEMENTS. ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR BOTH CUBILLO AND THE POLISARIO HAS RESULTED IN RECURRING PROBLEMS BETWEEN SPAIN AND ALGERIA, AND AT PRESENT EACH COUNTRY IS REPRESENTED BY A CHARGE IN THE OTHER'S CAPITAL. THE SAHARA PROBLEM HAS A DOMESTIC DIMENSION, IN THAT THE PSOE FULLY SUPPORTS THE POLISARIO AND ECHOES ALGERIAN CALLS FOR THE DEROGATION OF THE MADRID AGREEMENTS (MADRID 752).
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 123370

5. THE MIDDLE EAST. SPAIN HAS LONG STRESSED ITS HISTORICAL TIES WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE EXPRESSES NO DIFFERENCE WITH THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE ARABS (WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL

THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL COUNTRIES OF THE REGION TO EXIST WITHIN SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, AND RECOGNITION OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL RIGHTS). SPAIN HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, DEFENDING THIS EXCEPTION TO ITS ALL-COUNTRIES RULE (ALBANIA AND NORTH KOREA ARE THE OTHERS) BY NOTING THAT TO STABLISH THEM NOW, IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME MEANINGFUL PROGRESS TOWARD AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF THE ME ISSUE, WOULD CAUSE RESENTMENT BY THE ARABS WHICH IT CANNOT AFFORD. IN ADDITION TO ITS HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON ARAB OIL, SPAIN HOPES TO DEVELOP IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, AND CONSIDERS THAT IT NEEDS ARAB DIPLOMATIC BACKING ON THE CANARIES AND SAHARA DISPUTES.

6. EASTERN EUROPE. THE DEATH OF FRANCO AND THE ONSET OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN OPENED THE WAY FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND EASTERN EUROPE, BUT DESPITE THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF THE CHANGE AND AN APPARENT DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO BRING TRADE AND OTHER CONTACTS UP TO MORE NORMAL INTERNATIONAL LEVELS, RELATIONS HAVE SO FAR REMAINED AT A LOW EBB, WITH LIMITING FACTORS RANGING FROM ORDINARY COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS TO SPAIN'S SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WEST. AN EFFORT IS NEVERTHELESS BEING MADE, AND ON THE EE SIDE INCLUDES A SOVIET REQUEST, SO FAR FENDEED OFF BY THE GOS, FOR MERCHANT MARINE BUNKERING FACILITIES IN THE SPANISH PORT OF ALGECIRAS, NEXT TO GIBRALTAR (MADRID A-79).

7. LATIN AMERICA. SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS HAVE FOR OBVIOUS REASONS LONG STRESSED THE LATIN
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 123370

AMERICAN CONNECTION, AND POST-FRANCO SPAIN HAS CARRIED THE EFFORT FORWARD, WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE REAL TASK IS TO BACK PAST RHETORIC WITH CONCRETE ACTIONS. KING JUAN CARLOS HAS VISITED SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA SINCE COMING TO THE THRONE, AND HIS INTEREST HAS HELPED SPUR ACTION WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY AT HOME. THE FORMER "INSTITUTE OF SPANISH CULTURE", ESSENTIALLY A CULTURAL EXCHANGE ORGANIZATION, HAS BEEN RE-NAMED THE "IBERO-AMERICAN CENTER FOR COOPERATION", AND BEEN GIVEN THE ADDITIONAL FUNCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL, COMMERCIAL, AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION. GOS OFFICIALS NOTE THAT RESULTS FROM THIS NEW EFFORT ARE NOT YET IN, BUT THEY ARE HOPEFUL, AND CONSIDER THAT THE LA REACTION HAS BEEN POSITIVE. AN OBSERVER AT THE OAS, SSAIN NEVER BROKE WITH CUBA FOLLOWING THE CASTRO TAKEEOVER, AND SPANISH TRADE WITH CUBA IS SECOND TO THAT WI VENEZUELA IN TOTAL VOLUME IN THE REGION (IN 1977, SPAIN-CUBA EXPORTS AND IMPORTS CAME TO SOMETHING OVER \$300 MILLION).

8. GIBRALTAR. THE ONSET OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN REMOVED A MAJOR BARRIER TO BRITISH TREATMENT OF THIS LONG-STANDING SPANISH COMPLAINT, AND SO FAR TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS HAVE BEEN HELD (IN STRASBOURG IN NOVEMBER 1977 AND IN PARIS IN MARCH 1978) BETWEEN THE SPANISH AND BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTERS, WITH GIBRALTAR'S CHIEF MINISTER SIR JOSHUA HASSAN AND OPPOSITION LEADER MAURICE XIBERRAS FORMING PART OF THE BRITISH DELEGATION. THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS HAS BEEN GOOD, WITH THE LAST ROUND AGREEING TO SET UP WORKING GROUPS ON SPECIFIC TOPICS, AND TO MEET AGAIN BEFORE THE END OF THIS SUMMER. SPAIN SEEKS A RETURN OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ROCK, NOTING THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL PERMIT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 123370

CONSIDERABLE REGIONAL AUTONOMY WHICH COULD BE APPLIED TO GIBRALTAR. THE GOS HAS ACCEPTED THE SINCERITY OF THE UK POSITION THAT NO CHANGE CAN OCCUR AGAINST THE WILL OF THE GIBRALTARIAN PEOPLE. HMG ALSO BELIEVES THAT AN EASING OF THE SPANISH RESTRICTIONS BARRING MAINLAND COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ROCK (APPLIED BY THE GOS IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1713 TREATY OF UTRECHT WHICH GAVE IT TO BRITAIN) WOULD HELP IMPROVE THE GIBRALTARIANS' DISPOSITION TOWARD SPAIN. BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WILL BE A LONG ONE. WE HAVE ADOPTED A NEUTRAL POSITION ON THE ISSUE.

9. NATO. THE GOS IS NOW ON RECORD AS FAVORING SPAIN'S JOINING NATO, AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONDITIONS ALLOWING (A SUBSTANTIAL "IF"), MAY SCHEDULE A FORMAL PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE REASONABLY SOON AFTER THE CONSTITUTION IS IN PLACE, WITH A VIEW TO POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES IN 1979. IN THE MEANTIME, THE GOS ESCHEWS INSTITUTIONAL CONTACTS WITH THE ALLIANCE, TO AVOID PRECIPITATING THE DEBATE AND TO COUNTER OPPOSITION CHARGES THAT THE GOS IS STACKING THE DECK. IN FACT THE PROSPECTS ARE LESS BRIGHT THAN THIS FORMAL GOS POSITION MAY SUGGEST. THE PSOE (WHICH OPPOSES NATO MEMBERSHIP) IS THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCK BUT THERE ARE ALSO ELEMENTS OF THE GOS AND THE ARMY WHICH REMAIN IN DOUBT. EVEN THOSE IN FAVOR PROBABLY GREATLY EXAGGERATE THE PRICE TAG SPAIN CAN PUT ON ITS POSSIBLE ENTRY. PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE TOPIC HAS INCREASED RECENTLY, WITH CENTRAL THEMES BEING THE POSSIBLE DESTABILIZATION OF DETENTE, LIKELY FINANCIAL COSTS TO SPAIN, AND THE EFFECT ON SPAIN'S INTERNATIONAL FREEDOM OF MANEUVER. (ALSO HEARD AT TIMES ARE SUCH UNFOUNDED ACCUSATIONS AS THAT WE ARE "PRESSURING" THE GOS ON THE SUBJECT, AND THAT WE WANT SPAIN IN NATO IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO BUILD A MILITARY BASE IN THE CANARY ISLANDS.) WE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 123370

HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD WELCOME SPANISH MEMBERSHIP, BUT HAVE ADOPTED A LOW POSTURE, STRESSING THAT THE DECISION IS SPAIN'S TO MAKE.

10. THE US. BILATERAL RELATIONS OVERALL ARE GOOD. SINCE FRANCO'S DEATH WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR OUR SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN SPAIN. THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH A BROAD RANGE OF POLITICAL GROUPS, INCLUDING OCCASIONAL MIDDLE-LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE PCE. BILATERAL QUESTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUES OF ANY CONSEQUENCE ON THE INTERNAL SPANISH POLITICAL SCENE DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. THIS SITUATION WILL OF COURSE CHANGE AS WE DRAW NEARER TO THE EXPIRATION (IN 1981) OF THE 1976 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. IN THE MEANTIME, ORGANS SET UP UNDER THE TREATY, INCLUDING THE US-SPANISH COUNCIL (WHICH IS CHAIRED BY THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND IS SCHEDULED TO MEET TWICE A YEAR) AND SUBSIDIARY JOINT COMMITTEES (MILITARY, STATUS OF FORCES, NATO MATTERS, ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL, AND EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL) ARE FUNCTIONING, GENERALLY TO GOOD EFFECT. THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS BEEN USEFUL TO US IN ADDRESSING SPANISH CONCERNS BOUT THE IMBALANCE IN BILATERAL TRADE AND ACCESS OF SPANISH GOODS TO THE US MARKET. A CHRONIC PROBLEM, RAISED TO NEW DIMENSIONS IN DEMOCRATIC SPAIN, WAS FLAGGED BY PRIME MINISTER SUAREZ IN HIS APRIL 18 PRESS CONFERENCE (HIS FIRST), WHEN HE DREW ATTENTION TO SPANISH UNHAPPINESS WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TREATY. THESE COMMENTS WERE INSPIRED BY FIRST VICE PRESIDENT AND DEFENSE MINISTER (LT GEN) GUTIERREZ MELLADO, WHO WAS THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY NEGOTIATOR OF THE 1976 TREATY, AND WHO HAS OVER THE
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 123370

PAST TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS MADE KNOWN REPEATEDLY HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE ABSENCE (IN HIS VIEW) OF A TRUE SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP AND EQUALITY, THE INSUFFICIENCY OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE, AND HIS PERCEPTION THAT US ARMS TRANSFER/MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY TOWARD SPAIN HAS TIGHTENED SINCE THE TREATY CAME INTO EFFECT IN SEPTEMBER 1976 (MADRID 4236 AND MADRID 5135).

11. IN SUM, SPAIN'S CONSCIOUS EFFORT TO SEEK A NEW INTERNATIONAL IDENTITY AND ROLE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY THE CONSCIOUS RETENTION OF CERTAIN TRADITIONAL THEMES, WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, BOTH OLD AND NEW, ADDING TO THE BURDEN. THIS HAS MEANT A VERY FULL

PLATE FOR SPAIN, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE ITS FOREIGN
POLICY OUTREACH WAS SO STUNTED DURING THE FORTY YEARS
OF FRANCO. THE EFFORT IS BOTH AMBITIOUS AND UNDER-
STANDABLE; THE PROCESS OF FLESHING OUT THE NEW IDENTITY
WILL TAKE SOME TIME. EATON UNQUOTE VANCE

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